Abstract Dynamic two-person games are considered, in which the roles of the players are hierarchical. One player behaves as a leader, the other one as a follower. Such games are named after Stackelberg. In the current paper, a special type of such games is considered, known in the literature as inverse Stackelberg games. In such games, the leader announces his strategy as a mapping from the follower's decision space into his own decision space. Arguments for studying such problems are given. This paper specifically studies dynamic games, i.e. the underlying model is described by an ordinary differential equation. The decisions of both players have a time component. As in the static case, the routine way of analysis, leading to a study of composed functions, is not very fruitful. Other approaches are given, mainly by studying specific examples.
where u L , u F ∈ R. Each player wants to choose its own decision variable in such a way as to minimize its own cost function. Without giving an equilibrium concept, the problem as stated so far is not well defined. Such an equilibrium concept could for instance be one named after Nash or after Pareto [2] . In this paper, the inverse Stackelberg equilibrium as it was introduced in [3] , will be considered. The leader announces a function γ L (·) which maps u F into u L . Examples of games with such informatiom structures are:
• Think of the leader being the government and of the follower as a citizen. The government states how much income tax the citizen has to pay and this tax will depend on the income u F of the citizen. It is up to the citizen as to how much money to earn (by working harder or not) and thus he can choose u F . The income tax the government will receive equals γ L (u F ), where the "rule for taxation" γ L (·), in many countries piecewise linear, was made known ahead of time.
• The leader is the bank and the follower the investor. The investor can buy stocks, with the bank as intermediator, with the money he has in his savings account. Suppose he buys stocks worth u F Euros. Then the bank will charge him γ L (u F ) as transaction costs. The function γ L (·) has been made known by the bank before the actual transaction takes place [4, 5] .
Given the function γ L (·), the follower will make his choice u F according to
Subsequently the decision of the leader, who is supposed to stick to what he promised, is then u * L = γ L (u * F ). Optimizing quantities will be provided with an asterix. The leader, before announcing his γ L (·), will of course realize how the follower will play and he should exploit this knowledge in order to choose the best possible γ -function, such that ultimately his own cost function J L becomes as small as possible. Symbolically, we could write
In this way, one enters the field of composed functions [6] , which is known to be a notoriously complex area.
In [1] , we dealt with problems in which each of the players had to make one decision only. Sometimes such problems are called static. In the current paper, extensions are considered in which the players must act more often, either in a discrete time or a continuous time setting, and such problems are called dynamic. In the latter case, one is usually given a model,
through which the players interact. The state x of this model evolves in time (indicated by t) according to the differential equationẋ = f . The dot on a variable refers to the time derivative, i.e.ẋ = dx dt . Generally the state is an n-dimensional vector (written as x ∈ R n ), but in this paper we will confine ourselves to n = 1, and it will be considered on the interval 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where T represents a fixed final time. The vector x 0 is the initial condition. The quantities u i , i = L, F, are scalar functions of time possibly restricted to a certain set: u i (t) ∈ U i (t). The function u i must be chosen in such a way as to minimize the cost function
both g i and q i are scalar functions and are assumed to satisfy certain regularity conditions such that the cost functions are well defined. Under suitable conditions on the function f , the time evolution of x is uniquely determined by the differential equation. There are no restrictions on x(T ); we deal with so-called free endpoint problems. With respect to the equilibrium concept, various extensions to the static situation exist, even within a leader-follower context; see [2] for some possibilities.
In [1] , some references with respect to "classic", i.e. static, Stackelberg games were given. Some references with respect to the more recently developed dynamic Stackelberg game theory are [5] and [7] [8] [9] .
The further content of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, the main problem is formulated. In Sects. 3 and 4, two dynamic examples are considered and it is shown what the difficulties are in obtaining the solutions. The mathematically oriented reader should be warned somewhat that, at this moment, only little theory is available (with for instance theorems about existence, uniqueness), and that the theory is still in its infancy by discovering phenomena by means of examples.
Problem Statement
The main problem to be considered iṡ
The notation has been changed somewhat here. Instead of u F , we write simply u for the decision variable of the follower. The function γ is up to the choice of the leader (we do not write u L anymore) subject to the restriction
Occasionally, we will also require that γ is nondecreasing with respect to |u|. Also note that the cost function of the follower, including the integral term with the γ -function, is indicated by J c F (the notation J F will be reserved for this cost function without the integral term containing the γ -function). The inverse Stackelberg equilibrium should be recognized easily by means of the notation: the leader announces the function γ which thus becomes known to the follower who subsequently chooses u.
A possible interpretation of this model is that the follower is an investor who wants to maximize his wealth, To be more precise, u(t) denotes a transaction density, i.e. during the time interval [t, t + dt] the number of transactions equals u(t)dt. For u = 0, no transaction takes place (γ (0) = 0). Such transactions cost money and we assume that the bank wants to maximize these transaction costs as indicated by (3) . These costs are added to the costs of the follower as indicated in (2) . Another reasonable restriction on γ is that γ (u) is nondecreasing with respect to |u|. The higher the number of transactions (either buying or selling, one being related to a positive u, the other one to a negative u), the higher the costs.
In the sections to come, it will become clear that the main problem as stated is a difficult one. In [5] , a variational approach, starting from the Hamiltonian H in the minimum principle formulation of Pontryagin [10] , which lead to a condition containing composed functions [6] , was suggested without much success.
As a direct extension of Theorem 2.1 from [1] , we have that an upper bound for the profit of the bank is J F (u ≡ 0) − J F (u = u * ), where J F is the follower's pure cost function, i.e. without the additional banking costs and where u * minimizes this pure cost function (of course subject to the state equation (1)). In [5] , the following conjecture was posed.
Conjecture 2.1 Generic sufficiency conditions for the bank to have its profit arbitrarily close to the upper bound given above (this property is referred to as incentive controllability in [2] ) are either one of the following:
• The integrand γ is allowed to depend explicitly on t, i.e. γ (t, u(t));
• γ depends on u only and u * is constant.
This conjecture is false as will be shown by the examples to come.
First Dynamic Example
The model isẋ
and the criterion is min u J F , where
In this optimal control problem, the integral term in the cost function is simply part of this cost function; it is not to be considered as transaction costs (transaction costs will be added shortly). The optimal solution is obtained through the following formulas:
and hence,
The notation H stands for Hamiltonian. The minimum principle of Pontryagin dictates that H must be minimized with respect to u. The above optimal control problem is now extended to a game problem by adding transaction costs. The criterion is changed into min c u J F , where
The function γ satisfies the by now usual restrictions γ (·) ≥ 0, γ (0) = 0. There is another criterion for the second player:
where
Ad Hoc Approach
A likely candidate for the optimal γ is γ (u) = −( [1] .) Here γ is, if would be zero, equal to −H on the essential interval. We now find
Note that, with this choice of γ , if it is optimal, Conjecture 2.1 does not hold. The bank can do better, however, even with a quadratic γ . Let us try
on a certain interval to be determined. Automatically γ (0) = 0. Under the condition β > −1, it is straightforward to show that
, the parameters α and β must necessarily satisfy J c
which is always fulfilled for β > −1. Consider
The maximization with respect to α leads to α = −2
4+β , which in turn leads to
.
Based upon this, the best value for β is β = −1 + , where is an arbitrarily small positive number. Subsequently, α = − . This leads to
which is a best result for the bank within the class of quadratic γ functions. Without the transaction costs for the investor, its costs would be
which is less than what he would have obtained by playing u = 0. Now that α and β have given values, it must be checked whether γ (u * ) > 0 in a neighborhood of u * . This is fortunately true. Further away from u * , the function γ can be adjusted such that γ (·) ≥ 0 everywhere. One might be tempted to think 1 that the bank can get its transaction costs arbitrarily close to 1 4 by means of the following nonquadratic choice:
Here is an arbitrarily small positive number. We will consider directly the more general case
where δ is a parameter to be chosen by the leader. Without loss of generality, we may assume that the follower's answer is of the form
for certain parameters 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1 and v. With these parameters, one can easily derive that, apart from -terms,
Minimization with respect to both v and σ leads to
Let us now consider the leader's role. He wants to maximize
If we continue to disregard the -terms, this constraint is always satisfied and maximization of J L leads to δ = 
Two Time Steps
Here, we consider a discretized version of the continuous time problem. The model is
and the criteria are
In Sect. 3.3, we will consider the same problem again, but then with more than 2 time steps.
First Attempt
With the text immediately above Conjecture 2.1 in mind, a reasonable assumption seems to be that J c F is minimized for the u i -values which minimize
These values are u 1 = u 2 = − 1 2 . Since
we try the γ -function
with a small positive . With this γ -function and with
, it is easily shown that
Please note that
2 )) exactly equals 3 32 which is the same fraction as which appeared in the previous formula. This is no coincidence; if the follower only played optimally during the second step, he faces a half times the total transaction costs as expressed by J L in (6) .
As it stands, with the γ chosen, the Hessian of J F with respect to u 1 and u 2 is not positive definite at the point u i = − 
If we require the function γ to be even, then it is defined for u > 0 also. With this choice of γ , the best the follower can do is to choose u i = − 
Second Attempt
This is a brute force attempt and starts from the basics of what the leader might be able to achieve. Inspired by the note in the previous subsection, we (actually the leader) now try to find α and β values, not to be confused with the same symbols in Sect. 3.1, that maximize
Because of the symmetry with respect to u 1 and u 2 , an equivalent problem is to maximize
Again using the symmetry (since we can assume u * 1 = u * 2 ), another equivalent problem is to maximize the sum of these two expressions,
This leads to α = β = − 
for suitably chosen α = β = 0. The maximal δ is obtained for α = β = − 
with δ = 1 5 is the optimal function for the leader. This is not true. The follower, minimizing
faces three possibilities:
1. Suppose that u * 1 = 0 and u * 2 = 0. Then, the best solution is u * 1 = u * 2 = − (9), but rather as
The first part at this right-hand side makes J F (u, − Unfortunately, this is not the whole story. The Hessian of
and is not positive definite for < If monotonicity of γ with respect to |u|, tacitly assumed above, is not required, then another candidate strategy for the leader is
5 , large, elsewhere, which turns out to be optimal as well.
Many Time Steps and Limit to Infinity
In this subsection, we investigate the solution if more than two time steps are used to approximate the original continuous time problem and what happens if the number of time steps approaches infinity. Will in the latter case the solution become identical to the one of Sect. 3.1? We consider the model
and the criteria
The equivalent expression for (8) becomes
The derivative of this expression with respect to u 1 equals zero. Substitution of u 2 = · · · = u N = u 1 subsequently leads to
For N = 2, this coincides with the results of the previous subsection. For N → ∞, we get u * i = − 
where * is a short-hand notation for u 2≤i≤N = − N 3N −1 . For this function,
which is the N -equivalent of (7). If we calculate N(
, which equals the profit of the bank (as already obtained earlier). Apart from an term, it is necessary from the leader's point of view that
or with a quadratic term,
For N → ∞, this leads to exactly the optimal quadratic function obtained before. This is at least true for = 0. The terms linear in differ, however. We now write 
Second Dynamic Example
The example treated in Sect. 3 is relatively simple in the sense that the optimal u is a constant, both for the continuous time and the discrete time problems. The example of this section is more complicated in the sense that the optimal u varies with time. The starting point is the dynamic model
An essential difference with the problem of the previous section is that the optimal control is not constant anymore: u * (t) = −e −t which leads to the minimal value
In the discretized problems (see the coming subsections) we cannot expect all u * i to be equal anymore. Consequently γ (u) will have to be specified in the neighbourhood of these different u * i -values. The best quadratic γ can be calculated as before for the other example. As in Sect. 3 we try γ (u) = 1 2 βu 2 + αu. The value function, to be minimized with respect to α and β, is (assuming that x(0) = 1)
where S(t), k(t) and m(t) satisfy, see [2] ,
It does not seem a very appetizing exercise to work this out analytically.
Two Time Steps
The model is as before, (4). The criterion for the leader also remains the same, but the criterion for the follower is now defined as
The best the leader can hope for is the maximum value of merically it was found that the solution, satisfying all inequalities, is δ 1 = and the criteria are
First, we want to solve min u J F subject to the model equations. This leads to a linear
A numerical exercise indicates that the solution u converges towards −e −t , as it should, as N → ∞. An upper bound for what the leader can hope for is obtained via the calculation of the maximum (with respect to u i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N) of
. . .
(compare the addition of (10) and (11)) provided that all the optimizing u i -values are different. Written out, this expression becomes
Differentiation with respect to j leads to
where Above, it was assumed that all u i -values were different (which also followed from numerical evidence). In case of all u i -values being equal, an upper bound for the best the leader can hope for is the maximum value of δ for which the following inequalities hold for a suitable choice of the α i 's (all being equal): 
In general, the leader will have to deal with a mixture of the extreme cases (14) and (16) In general, this function will not be monotone with respect to |u| and its "usefulness" seems questionable for N → ∞.
Conclusions
In [1] it was concluded that inverse Stackelberg problems are very hard to analyze and in that paper only static problems were considered. That conclusion remains valid for the dynamic problems of the current paper. One of the reasons to study dynamic problems in this context is that they seem to show up in reality more often.
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